Division, Distraction, Problem, Reaction, Solution: There will be NO Invasion of Ukraine before June


Over the last month or two, Western media have been publishing ever more hysterical articles about the immanent invasion of Ukraine by Russia. This has largely been fuelled by the Biden Administration.

By OneAngryAussie

We’ve seen urgent meetings of various leaders, sometimes at the opposite ends ridiculously large tables. We see reports of arms shipments urgently flown into Ukraine and troops deployed to various NATO countries.

Ukrainian President Zelensky was reported by RT News as saying to US officials “Should you or anybody else have additional information about a 100% invasion of Ukraine by Russia, starting on February 16, please give us such information,” Apparently, no such information was forthcoming. Why? On 15th February it was reported that President Zelensky along with senior Ukrainian officials were contradicting the US narrative that a Russian invasion was days away. The prediction then was it would occur on 16th February. Fortunately, the residents of western Ukraine didn’t awake to the rumble of Russian tanks through their streets. Yesterday there’s a report by Estonian sources that the invasion is now due in mid to late February. Today, President Biden’s back in the news, telling reporters that “every indication that we have is that they are prepared to go into Ukraine, attack Ukraine.” C’mon man! Wolf! I say. Indeed, the never ending Russian invasion predictions look more and more like some end-of-the-world cult, who keep changing the date when the sun rises after every predicted doomsday. President Zelensky and his defence ministry officials are confident that the Russians will not invade their country in the coming weeks. Why? How do they know this? If you want to know when Russia is likely to attack any of her western neighbours, one only needs to look to WW2 and the major offensives of both the German and Soviet armies. They started summer offensives in June or mostly mid-July, that ended mostly late September or early October. They started winter offensives in late November or mostly December, most finishing by late February or March, with a couple of outliers running into April and May. From 1942 no large scale operations were launched outside of these periods, but there were some operations that were continuations of ongoing campaigns. It was mostly what Germans might call sitzkreig unless you were at Stalingrad or Leningrad. Why is this so? The weather. The spring thaw and autumn rains make the countryside impassable for vehicles, tracked or wheeled. The mud. There’s a word for it in Russian, rasputitsa. There’s no English equivalent, though it translates as mudslides or impassability, but better describes the “season of mud”. Many historical documentaries of the WW2 Russian campaign have footage of the stalled German advance in October and November 1941, with trucks and tanks bogged to the axles and troops struggling knee deep in mud. The Germans learned what rasputitsa means the hard way. If you look at the Russian offensives, they mostly kicked off in July because they had to wait until late May for the ground to dry enough to start trucking supplies up to the front, building them up in June. When Ukrainian President Zelensky contradicted the Americans saying a Russian invasion is not immanent, he didn’t need any spies to tell him their secret plans. He knows what the Ukrainian steppes are like at this time of year. No general in their right mind is going to order their tanks forward, only to get bogged axle deep in mud and be sitting ducks for the enemy. Similarly, the recent Russian exercises were winter exercises. They had to finish soon and get back to their transport depots before the thaw leaves them stranded for a couple of months. Were Russia planning to invade Ukraine, they’d have likely done it in December, or now, they have to postpone it until June because of the weather. Should fighting erupt in the coming weeks, it would most likely be as a result of a provocation by Ukraine or more likely, agent provocateurs operating at the behest of an interested party, shall we say. As to the motives underlying the American policy towards Ukraine and the war hysteria they are promoting, one can but speculate. Could it be a psyop to get people in the West afraid of nuclear warfare again? We could do with new fear now that covid is scaring fewer and fewer people. Could there be a desire to undermine the Ukrainian economy? Ukrainian authorities are describing the economic costs of borrowing and trade difficulties caused by rumours of impending war. Are there some seeking to profit from short positions in Ukrainian assets or desirous of purchasing assets at bargain basement prices? Could there be a desire to drive a wedge between Russia and EU NATO members? How would that impact future EU energy purchasing? Is there an alternate supplier hoping to benefit from a shortfall or curtailment of Russian gas supplies? Perhaps a little foreign war as a distraction from disastrous domestic economic policies? Shoring up support for a failing administration with a wave of nationalism ahead of elections later this year? Maybe. This works for BoJo too, who also seems to be banging the war drums over the last couple of weeks to drown out the noise of Downing Street parties. Could there be government hawks inspired by the movie Wag the Dog! to start a little war to shore up Presidential approval? But, unlike the fictional movie where the country they pick on was a puppy, this time they’re messing with a bear. It seems to me that the only leaders behaving like statesmen this past week are Presidents Putin and Zelensky. The others look like a bunch of right berks, Chicken Littles screaming the sky is falling. Sources:

https://www.rt.com/russia/549399-us-prediction-imminent-invasion/ https://www.rt.com/russia/549477-ukraine-comments-imminent-russian-invasion/ https://www.rt.com/russia/549596-ukraine-losing-billions-western-hysteria/ https://www.rt.com/russia/549731-biden-ukraine-invasion-every-indication/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_operations_of_the_Red_Army_in_World_War_II